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INTRODUCTION
The Emergence of Student Activism in Burmai
Since the final decades of the colonial era, the Fighting Peacock has remained the symbol of Burmese student movements, whether against 
the British colonial government or the military gov-
ernment of General Ne Win.ii In the words of Phyo 
Min Thein, former Secretary-General of the All Bur-
ma Federation of Student Unions, “Student activism 
is very deep-rooted in Burma’s history,” with students 
pushing for both widened student autonomy and the 
end of the dictatorship.1 In the 1930s and 1940s, stu-
dent leaders led the struggle for independence from 
British rule and later became political leaders. Gen-
eral Ne Win’s coup d’état on March 2, 1962, marked 
the beginning of Burma’s fifty years of military rule, 
but student activism continued to challenge dictator-
ship during this period. Before the coup, the Rangoon 
University Act had protected the academic autonomy 
of Rangoon University. On May 9, 1962, however, the 
Rangoon University Act was annulled by the Revolu-
tionary Council that had taken over the administration 
of the university. On July 7, approximately 2,000 stu-
dents from Rangoon University participated in a mass 
meeting in response to the Act’s abolition. According 
to student activist and author Lay Myint, “virtually the 
whole university” showed up to protest the suppres-
i  In 1989, Burma’s military junta changed the English translation of the 
country’s name from “Burma” to “Myanmar” as well as the names of places 
within the country. The use of names in this thesis follows this timeframe.
ii  The peacock is the national symbol of Burma.
sion of university autonomy under the new military 
government.2 Another massive protest occurred in 
1974, when General Ne Win’s refusal to hold a state 
funeral for former United Nations Secretary-General 
U Thant triggered 8,000 Burmese to join a student-led 
protest against the dictatorship on December 10.3 The 
1988 Uprising, triggered by Ne Win’s sudden with-
drawal of banknotes without compensation in Sep-
tember 1987 and brutal suppress on student protests 
in March 1988, reached its climax in the student-led 
nationwide general strike on August 8, in which mil-
lions of Burmese demonstrated on the streets against 
military rule. Despite military repression, student pro-
tests broke out again in the 1990s. Hundreds of stu-
dents demonstrated in Yangon in December 1996 to 
call for improvements in education and the right to 
establish student unions free from military control.4 
Student protests took place again in August and Sep-
tember of 1998 to support the National League for De-
mocracy’s (NLD) demand to convene the parliament 
according to the 1990 elections, as the military had 
refused to recognize their loss and hand over power to 
the League. This brief history demonstrates the influ-
ential role of student activism in Burma’s democratic 
movements. In short, student movements have histor-
ically been the country’s political vanguard.
Student activism has been a prominent feature of 
mass democratic movements across Asia.5 My thesis 
focuses on the political circumstances that led to the 
rise and decline of student activism in Burma along 
three levels of analysis: (1) the international environ-
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Historically, student activism played a prominent role in Burmese democratic movements, 
yet today its role has diminished. This thesis investigates the rise and decline of Burmese 
student activism along three levels of analysis—international, state, and civil society—us-
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past fifty years. It analyzes Burmese student movements through the “dynamics of conten-
tion” approach to social movements. Most prominently, the theory of political opportunity 
structures (POS) is applied to the state-level analysis. The analytical framework follows 
a chronological order of three phases: 1962 to 1988; 1988 to 2000s; and 2000s to today.
72
columbia university journal of politics & society
ment; (2) the state; and (3) civil society.6, iii I also 
draw upon the “dynamics of contention” approach to 
social movements to explain the trajectory of student 
activism in Burma. In particular, I apply the theory 
of political opportunity structures (POS) in my state-
level analysis to explain how state actions constrained 
political opportunities for opposition movements in 
Burma. In my analysis of civil society, I draw upon 
the concept of actor constitution to illustrate how 
Burmese student groups cultivated a student activist 
identity in response to state oppression. My analytical 
framework is divided into three phases: 1962-1988; 
1988-2000s; and 2000s-present, which correspond to 
three historical phases of state-led changes in political 
opportunities that affected the nature of contentious 
politics among Burmese student groups.
This thesis looks at the state level in detail be-
cause of the relative insignificance of the international 
dimension in the case of Burma. More importantly, 
the state has had a decisive influence over the politi-
cal context in which student and civil society groups 
have operated since 1962. In the first phase, the mili-
tary regime isolated the country; in the second phase, 
the country was isolated economically through inter-
national sanctions and access to foreign media was 
largely limited. Today, Myanmar is still at a very early 
stage of global engagement. 
Between 1962 and 1988 (phase 1), student groups 
thrived because they had a unique opportunity to 
emerge as the country’s sole viable opposition. How-
ever, state actions weakened political opportunities for 
student movement growth after 1988 (phases 2 and 3). 
Two significant changes in political opportunity struc-
tures helped shape the subsequent response and re-
actions of civil society. First, the strengthening of po-
litical control over education after 1988 destroyed the 
foundation of student activism and led to its decline. 
Second, while the release of 1,988 student leaders in 
2005 contributed to the temporary re-emergence of 
the historic All Burma Federation of Student Unions 
in 2007, state-led political reforms from 2011 onwards 
have fostered a pluralistic society with political space 
for the proliferation of student groups and other ele-
ments of civil society. These developments weakened 
the power of Myanmar’s student groups, transform-
ing them from significant political actors into the dis-
iii  This thesis borrows the idea of “levels of analysis” popularized by Kenneth 
Waltz in international relations theory and applies it to the study of student 
activism. However, the “civil society level” is used instead of the “individual 
level” as the smallest unit of analysis.
persed, largely apolitical entities they are today.
BACKGROUND
Dynamics of contention: a literature review
The dynamics of contention approach focuses on 
the interplay between the state and contentious politi-
cal actors to elucidate how social movements emerge 
and develop. In a pioneering study of contentious 
politics, Peter Eisinger explained how “the degree to 
which groups are likely to be able to gain access to 
power and to manipulate the political system”—what 
he called the “structure of political opportunities”—
affected how protests developed in American cities in 
the late 1960s. Eisenger believed that state actions were 
critical in expanding or constraining opportunities for 
contentious politics.7 Charles Tilly similarly posited 
that states can repress or promote social movements 
by “altering the relative costs of particular tactics” to 
potential political opponents.8 In other words, Eis-
inger and Tilly argued that state actions alter the ex-
tent to which political opportunities for contentious 
politics are available to political actors. Sidney Tarrow 
concisely defined political opportunity structures as 
“consistent—but not necessarily formal, permanent 
or national—sets of clues that encourage people to 
engage in contentious politics.”9 In other words, po-
litical opportunity structures are dimensions of politi-
cal context that shape people’s expectations of success 
or failure in launching collective actions. When they 
are confident in their “capacity to bring an impact” to 
their social environment and have a high “prospect for 
successful collective actions,” they are more likely to 
engage in said actions since they have a greater incen-
tive to participate.10 
Douglas McAdam summarized two of the essen-
tial components of political opportunity structures: 
(1) “the relative openness or closure of the institution-
alized political system;” and (2) “the state’s capacity 
and propensity for repression.”11 POS thus provides 
an appropriate framework to explain the dynamics 
between the state and student activism, which is the 
core of this thesis. Herbert Kitschelt similarly divided 
political opportunity structures into political input 
structures and political output structures, a schema 
that is utilized in this thesis (see Figure 1).12 The for-
mer refers to states’ “openness” or “closeness” to inputs 
from non-established actors; in other words, the abil-
ity of informal political actors to make societal de-
mands. The latter concerns states’ capacities (strong or 
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weak) to implement effective policies, which is used to 
suppress opposition rather than deliver services in this 
thesis. Kitschelt argued that the openness of political 
input structures and the strength of political output 
structures largely influence the nature of political op-
position movements, a phenomenon that we will later 
observe in Burma. For example, the more closed in-
put structures are and the stronger a state’s capacity to 
suppress the opposition, the more likely the political 
opposition will have to develop extra-institutionally, 
i.e., underground, as was the case in Burma. In this 
example, we can see how political opportunity struc-
tures determine how the political opposition emerges 
and develop in response to state actions.
In the landmark study of social movements, 
Dynamics of Contention, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 
studied fifteen political struggles throughout history 
and around the world, and identified “actor constitu-
tion” as one of the essential shared processes of these 
movements.”13 In this process, opposition groups 
emerge by constructing a shared identity, or “social 
appropriation,” which “paves the way for innovative 
action by reorienting an existing group to a new con-
ception of its collective purpose.”14 It may then lead 
to “category formation”—the “creation of a set of sites 
sharing a boundary distinguishing [these opposition 
groups] to at least one set of sites visibly excluded by 
the boundary.”15 As Hank Johnston remarked, the 
process of actor constitution is “fundamental in resis-
tant episodes…[b]ecause repressive states constrain 
freedoms of group formation,” which means that “[the 
way] challengers emerge is of utmost importance.”16 
He also argued that “transgressive contention in re-
pressive regimes must be innovative because claim-
making channels are limited.”17 We will observe in 
the case of Burmese authoritarian rule, how student 
activists resisted and responded to brutal state repres-
sion by developing a shared identity through under-
ground activities at university campuses and had their 
demands for democracy and student autonomy heard 
through innovative, contentious political acts.
Finally, Tilly argued that “strong distinctive iden-
tities” and “dense interpersonal networks exclusive to 
group members” are two important components for 
mass mobilization; as a result, groups fulfilling these 
criteria are likely groups for which it would be useful 
to examine the dynamics of contention.18 As we will 
see, Burmese student activism fulfills both criteria. 
Moreover, since there is no systematic study on the in-
terplay between state actions and student movements 
in Burma, the dynamics of contention approach serves 
as an appropriate and novel lens to examine Burmese 
student movements in relation to the state.
Figure 1: Political opportunity structures: a general 
model
Student activism in Asia: a brief overview
In other cases of student activism in Asia, nota-
bly in Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand, students 
acted as the leading political opposition in the strug-
gle against authoritarianism for an extended period.19 
In these Asian societies, Western-style univer-
sity education provided students a window to new 
ideas, ranging from nationalism to democracy to 
Marxism.20 Among a small, educated elite, many stu-
dents felt inclined to lead political changes. A sense 
of Indonesian nationality was developed among such 
students, who declared “one motherland, one nation 
and one language” at the 1928 Youth Pledge.21 Simi-
larly, a doctrine of “passionate patriotism” developed 
among South Korean students in the late 1950s.22 In 
post-WWII Thailand, Marxist ideas gained popularity 
among educated elites and were spread by progressive 
publications and discussion groups that encouraged 
students to fight against Thailand’s military regime.23
Within campus settings, students enjoyed orga-
nizational advantages absent for many other groups in 
civil society and that were easily mobilized in each of 
these countries. Students were less restricted by fam-
ily responsibilities and social constraints than other 
groups and were exposed to peer influence through 
both student groups and hostels. Being outside the po-
litical sphere and uncontaminated by political corrup-
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in Burmese society and win public support as what 
Edward Aspinall termed society’s “moral force.”24 In 
short, students were “morally motivated and uniquely 
obliged to voice…political aspirations” by making use 
of their social capital (e.g., exposure to Western ideas, 
general respect in society) as well as educational infra-
structure (e.g., student groups and hostels).25 There-
fore, students occupied a unique position in postwar 
Asian societies that allowed a student-based political 
opposition to emerge; in many ways, the political op-
portunities for students were greater than for many 
other groups in civil society.
However, as Kitschelt reminds us, the political 
opposition can vary greatly, as their paths are influ-
enced largely by how much a state is willing to accom-
modate a plurality of opinions. While states that are 
open to inputs from non-establishment groups allow 
the opposition to work within existing political in-
stitutions, states with closed systems induce the op-
position to “adopt confrontational, disruptive strate-
gies orchestrated outside established channels.”26 In 
postwar Asia, political input structures were closed in 
Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand. In the absence 
of political infrastructure to absorb students’ discon-
tent, students engaged in extra-systemic activism dur-
ing Soeharto’s New Order Regime dictatorship in In-
donesia (1965-98), Park Chung Hyee and Chun Doo 
Hawn’s dictatorship in South Korea (1961-87), and 
the military regime of Sarit and Thanom in Thailand 
(1957-73).27 As we will see, similar dynamics of con-
tention played out in Burma in much of the twenti-
eth century, where student groups enjoyed advantages 
over other groups in civil society but were nonetheless 
forced to operate underground.
Contentious politics in modern Burma: filling the gaps 
in research
Although many of these same dynamics were 
present in Burma, Burmese student movements re-
main understudied in English-language political sci-
ence. Win Min provides a historical account from the 
anti-colonial struggle in the 1920s to the end of mili-
tary rule in 2011 and concluded that Burmese student 
activism is a “historic force” in which the “historical 
legacy of earlier student activists…motivated subse-
quent generations,” in particular the role of General 
Aung San, who was the leader of All Burma Federation 
of Student Unions (ABFSU) and Rangoon University 
Students’ Union (RUSU), in Burma’s independence.28 
Although Win Min writes about how the military gov-
ernment has affected “the nature and scope of Burma’s 
student activism,” the literature is notably silent in 
terms of its application of theoretical approach in the 
analysis. In William Hayes’s book review, he comments 
that Win Min “[focuses] on constructed identities and 
discourse analysis during activist periods, leaving the 
reader searching for institutional and organizational 
relations that bridge the crests.”29
In this thesis, I will build on Win Min’s claim and 
situate the analysis in the dynamics of contention ap-
proach—the application of the POS to examine the 
interplay between the state and students in an “oppo-
sition vacuum”, which I argue that Burmese student 
activism is its product, and “actor constitution” to 
study how a strong student political identity devel-
oped on top of the mere claim of “historical legacy.” 
This allows a comprehensive understanding of Bur-
mese student activism from both macro (state) and 
micro (civil society) levels, exploring the institutional 
and organizational relations between the state and 
students, and among opposition groups respectively.
In addition, Win Min provides limited informa-
tion on the development of student groups after the 
monk-led democratic movement in 2007. This thesis 
fills this important gap by providing a detailed account 
on student activism in recent years—during Myan-
mar’s reform process—which has not been covered in 
any previous study.
At the state level, this thesis provides a systematic 
analysis on how the state has altered political oppor-
tunities for student activism to develop in Burma. I 
emphasize its rise and decline in relation to the exis-
tence of what I term an “opposition vacuum.” I define 
“opposition vacuum” as a state of affairs in which sub-
stantive and effective opposition is absent under au-
thoritarian political control. In Burma, an opposition 
vacuum emerged after 1962 when the military gov-
ernment suppressed civil society groups including po-
litical parties and other opposition groups. In Burma, 
as in many Asian countries after WWII, students were 
the only group left in the vacuum with the potential 
to effectively mobilize against the military regime. In 
recent years, however, once non-student political ac-
tors and issues beyond democracy gradually emerged 
after 2008, the opposition vacuum contracted and the 
role of student groups as a significant political opposi-
tion group diminished. In other words, students were 
no longer in a leading position in civil society once 
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pluralistic politics took shape.
At the civil society level, the concept of “actor 
constitution” will be applied to understand how Bur-
mese student activists constructed a student activist 
identity through the “social appropriation” of political 
claims by pre-existing groups, including revolutionary 
leaders and even the current state itself. This, in turn, 
“[helped] redefine perceptions of threats and opportu-
nities” among the students.30 In this analysis, it is not 
the state, but ideas and legacies, that helped shape po-
litical opportunity structures at the civil society level. 
METHODOLOGY
This thesis is based on over sixty first-hand in-
terviews conducted by the author—mainly in Myan-
mar, but a few in Thailand and Hong Kong. Most of 
the interviews were arranged through civil society or-
ganizations (CSOs) and student groups in Myanmar 
as well as through preexisting personal connections. I 
was connected to the multiple generations of student 
leaders through the 88 Generation Students’ Group, 
the Myanmar Institute of Democracy, and the Yan-
gon School of Political Science—founded by former 
student leaders in 1988, 1996, and 1998 respectively. 
I was able to contact members of the current genera-
tion of activists as well as ordinary university students 
through the All Burma Federation of Student Unions, 
the Federation of Student Unions, and the University 
Students’ Union (i.e., the Yangon Institute of Econom-
ics Students’ Union and the Yangon University of For-
eign Languages Students’ Union). As the first three 
groups were founded by former student leaders and 
the latter three groups make up all of the existing stu-
dent groups in Myanmar, my interviews were able to 
cover a variety of views and opinions across all gen-
erations of student activists.
I chose these interviewees to cover student lead-
ers of each generation from 1962 to the present, as well 
as a variety of perspectives from civil society leaders, 
political party members, current students, and recent 
graduates from sixteen universities in Myanmar. Most 
of my interviews were conducted in Yangon, where 
the offices of most CSOs and student groups are lo-
cated and where most former and current student 
leaders reside; this leads me to believe that my sample 
is representative of the broader student activist popu-
lation in Myanmar. If interviews with former govern-
ment officials and military intelligence officers had 
been possible to conduct, the thesis would have been 
able to include perspectives from members of the state 
apparatus, which likely have contested many of my in-
terviewees’ claims; this represents a methodological 
limitation of my work that merits further exploration 
in the future. Nevertheless, this paper is very likely the 
first academic study to include significant number of 
interviews with Burmese student activists, in particu-
lar those from the current generation.
In general, my interviews were divided into three 
parts: (1) fact-finding and verification; (2) ideology 
and perspectives; and (3) the development of student 
activism. On average, each interview lasted for two 
and a half hours to allow in-depth and open-ended 
discussions. My interviews started off with back-
ground questions that served to understand the inter-
viewees’ past experience which might shape the way 
they think and act to evaluate the accuracy and iden-
tify bias, if any, of their claims. I would then continue 
with questions about factual information that elicited 
description of personal experiences (e.g. evidence of 
military surveillance, political pressure and under-
ground activities), strategies, actions and outcomes 
to learn about the level of state repression in different 
phases and subsequent response of students; and fig-
ures to get a general sense of how many students were 
involved, and support base of and relations among 
student groups at different times. In particular, I was 
interested in how state repression shaped students’ 
behavior and their organizational structures, how the 
student opposition groups survived and sustained 
their mobilization capacity and contentious political 
claims in the first phase, and how the change in “state 
factors” led to the decline of student activism (and the 
recent divergence) in the second and third phases.
Next, I would proceed to questions about opin-
ions, ideology and values on student activism to learn 
about different perspectives from students of different 
generations and backgrounds. My primary questions 
included why students took part in or refused to join 
student movements, what motivated or discouraged 
them to do so, what were their concerns, areas of in-
terest and expected role of students’ unions (e.g. po-
litical or education reform), and to what extent a stu-
dent political or non-political identity existed. These 
questions helped explain the decisions and actions of 
the interviewees which were essential to the under-
standing of the shift of emphasis, from revolution out-
side the system to minor reformism inside the system, 
and approach, from confrontation to negotiation, in 
recent years. Finally, I would engage in open-ended 
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discussion with the interviewees on the development 
of Burmese student activism to learn about its role in 
democratic movements in different points of history, 
in particular the current development.
PHASE 1 (1962-88):
STUDENTS AS CONTENTIOUS ACTORS UNDER 
MILITARY REPRESSION
At midnight on July 7, 1962, the Burmese mili-
tary bombed the birthplace of Burma’s independence 
and student activist movements—the Rangoon Uni-
versity Students’ Union Building—killing at least sev-
enteen students.31 This act served to ensure student 
organizations would disappear and “demonstrate the 
government’s willingness to deal forcefully with per-
ceived threat.”32 As General Ne Win famously re-
sponded following the crackdown, “[the military had] 
no alternatives but to fight sword with sword and spear 
with spear.”iv On March 28, 1964, the military govern-
ment issued the Law to Protect National Unity to ban 
all political parties except the ruling Burma Socialist 
Programme Party.33 However, the existence of such 
an opposition vacuum gave potential student activ-
ists an important political opportunity to emerge and 
develop even under military rule. Student activists 
organized underground and succeeded in sustaining 
mobilization capacity. Eventually, they led the general 
strike on August 8, 1988 against the military dictator-
ship, the largest nation-wide democratic movement 
ever in Burma’s history. 
How and why did students emerge between 1962 
and 1988 as Burma’s only dissident vanguard despite 
extensive military repression? This section aims to an-
swer this question along three levels of analysis: inter-
national, state, and civil society. A parallel structure 
will be used in the discussion of the second and third 
phases of Burmese student activism to identify the 
political changes that transformed students’ role over 
time.
International level: Activism in isolation
The 1960s was a watershed period of interna-
tional student activism. Ideological currents and in-
ternational awareness of other student movements 
travelled rapidly across the world through mass me-
dia and journals.34 University campuses all over Asia 
were affected by the Leftist wave of collective actions 
against ruling elites that challenged the political and 
social status quo in many regions around the world.35 
iv  The original Burmese phrase is “dah go dah gyin, hlan go hlan gyin.”
The protests of the New Left in Western Europe and 
North America—most notably, the May 1968 student 
movements in France involving violent street occupa-
tions and massive general strikes—inspired numerous 
student movements against dictatorships in Asia.36 
These Western Leftist student movements demon-
strated that students could become not merely partici-
pants in political dialogue but leaders of social change. 
Despite the international diffusion of revolu-
tionary ideas, however, Burmese students were only 
minimally influenced by international student activist 
trends. Pyone Cho, former Vice President of Rangoon 
University Students’ Union, explained that, before 
1962, universities enjoyed academic freedom and ac-
cess to books on topics “such as democracy, political 
theory and world history.”37 However, after 1962, the 
Revolutionary Council deliberately eliminated foreign 
economic and cultural influences through what Rob-
ert Holmes and others call “Burmanization” policies, 
which largely isolated the country from foreign po-
litical developments.38 Burmese students could only 
read and discuss Western political books left behind 
by seniors before the 1962 coup. In this context, Bur-
mese student groups did not reach out and connect 
to foreign student or political groups, suggesting that 
international developments from 1962 to 1988 could 
only have exerted a small, if any, effect on Burmese 
student movements.39 Burmese student activism was 
therefore not affected when the heyday of internation-
al student activism ended in the 1970s.40 As we will 
see, the trajectory of Burmese student activism did not 
follow world trends but rather Burma’s domestic po-
litical context at the state and civil society levels.
State level: Expanding political opportunities for 
student activism
As shown in Figure 2, the actions of the Bur-
mese state shaped the POS affecting student activ-
ism between 1962 and 1988 (see Figure 2). Various 
dimensions of Burma’s domestic political context al-
tered students’ expectations of success in social move-
ments. In terms of political input structures, Burma’s 
closed system generated an opposition vacuum for 
students possessing a growing resentment toward 
the government, which was reinforced by the state’s 
socioeconomic mismanagement; in terms of political 
output structures, the military exerted strong control 
over students. However, as the state did not separate 
students from university campuses, it was unable to 
eliminate the mobilization capacity of students. As we 
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will see, the concept of opposition vacuum is particu-
larly useful here, as it demonstrates that an effective 
opposition may take root even under closed political 
input structures and strong political output structures, 
which forces us to reassess traditional assumptions 
underlying the dynamics of contention approach.
Figure 2: Political opportunity structures in Burma: 
1962 to 1988
The opposition vacuum and political opportunity 
structures
Christopher Rootes argues that the absence of 
an effective opposition is “the most general condi-
tion of political systems that [stimulates]...student 
movements,” an assertion that seems to hold true for 
Burma, where state action eliminated the potential 
for non-student-based anti-regime activism.41 Since 
1962, the military has ruthlessly eliminated civil soci-
ety in Burma.42 The Revolutionary Council outlawed 
political parties and independent unions, with parties 
not materializing until 1988. Political dissidents, such 
as former student activists from the 1950s, were either 
in jail or unwilling to lead an opposition because of 
the possibility of military suppression.43 Moreover, 
neither farmers nor workers could organize them-
selves effectively given their scattered distribution 
and Burma’s poor transportation and communication 
technology.44 Given that university campuses provid-
ed students a unique meeting place to launch an op-
position movement, students were the only potential 
force with the capacity to fill this opposition vacuum. 
University campuses provided students with locations 
to organize activist groups and foster peer support for 
each other in the case that they were arrested. Accord-
ing to Pyone Cho, the former Vice President of RUSU, 
as well as Phyo Min Thein, a former Secretary-Gen-
eral of ABFSU, students felt the responsibility to lead 
campaigns against the military government in this 
context.45 As we will see, the availability of university 
campuses as grounds for political activism gave stu-
dents a unique potential for activism in Burma.
The Burmese government’s social and economic 
mismanagement:  
reducing opportunity costs and heightening political 
opportunities for students
Economic hardship gave students in Burma a 
perceived opportunity for political action. In April 
1962, the Revolutionary Council issued a treatise ti-
tled “The Burmese Way to Socialism,” which served 
as a blueprint for economic development.46 “Bur-
manization” rejected foreign investors, expelled non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and declined 
international financial assistance. Section 3 (1) of the 
Industries Nationalization Law, which went into effect 
in 1963, provided the legal grounds for the military 
to nationalize “any industry.” By early 1970s, all ma-
jor industries except agriculture, small-scale trading 
and services had been nationalized.47 Resources were 
used to serve generals’ private interests over the pub-
lic good.48 During 1962 to 1988, the resource gap 
between investment and national savings widened 
from -1.9 percent to 2.8 percent of the gross domestic 
product (GDP).49 These policies had disastrous ef-
fects on Burma’s economy and the livelihood of many 
Burmese. The military turned Burma from one of the 
most prosperous lands in Asia—given its wealth of 
natural resources and prime geographical location—
into one of the poorest countries in the world.50 In 
December 1987, Burma obtained United Nations Eco-
nomic and Social Council’s status of “Least Developed 
Country.”51
The Burmese government’s ineffective economic 
and social policies raised students’ incentives for col-
lective action, providing them with the confidence 
to organize against the military regime. Burma’s eco-
nomic and social mismanagement created a group of 
educated unemployed and thus a perceived mismatch 
between level of tertiary education and employment 
opportunities. Students could not find jobs that they 
believed they deserved considering their high educa-
tional attainment. The perceived absence of a promis-
ing future for students reduced students’ opportunity 
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to direct their discontent toward the government, 
whom they held responsible for their unemploy-
ment.52 
While the state’s economic and social policies re-
duced opportunity costs for student activists through-
out this period, perhaps the most noteworthy event 
took place on September 5, 1987, when Ne Win de-
monetized 75 percent of the nation’s banknotes with-
out compensation and drove millions into poverty. 
This particularly infuriated university students who 
could not afford to pay tuition fees to take their ex-
aminations and incited them to action.53 Thousands 
of Rangoon Institute of Technology (RIT) students 
protested on campus, making public what had previ-
ously been primarily underground.54 Ne Win’s poli-
cies rendered students hopeless about the future. As 
Pyone Cho and Phyo Min Thein explained, students 
had no choice but to cry for democracy; for Pyone 
Cho, “Revolution was the only hope to reform the sys-
tem for a better future.”55 As Ian Holliday points out, 
“The [1988] revolt was the product of economic dis-
content spreading across the land at the end of 1987 
and finding a political vehicle in student protest.”56
State control over students: a failure to prevent 
campus activism
Starting in 1962, the Revolutionary Council 
tightened university control with new campus regu-
lations. Student groups and gatherings were banned 
and “hostels [were] closed at 8 p.m.”57 After bombing 
the RUSU Building, the military arrested at least fifty 
student leaders and imposed military surveillance 
over students.58 Apart from forcing university lectur-
ers to monitor student activities, military intelligence 
recruited poor students as informers. For instance, 
Maung Soe, who later served as Deputy Chief of Po-
lice, was actively involved in every student meeting 
and protest under former student leader Lay Myint’s 
underground group but “was never arrested.”59 De-
spite his poor family background, according to Lay 
Myint, Maung Soe was frequently seen with “one to 
two hundred brand new one-Kyat notes,” suggesting 
that “he had been paid off by the Burmese govern-
ment.”60 Additionally, the military pressured family 
members of student activists, using tactics ranging 
from verbal warning to surveillance, interrogation, 
and arrests.61 Mya Than, father of Min Zin, the for-
mer student activist who went into hiding after 1988, 
experienced periodic arrests from 1989 until his death 
in 1997.62 
Despite these efforts, however, students were still 
able to organize underground activities given their 
access to university campuses. Rangoon University, 
which was located in the center of the city, provided 
student activists an excellent place to meet, organize, 
and mobilize for anti-government activities. Despite 
frequent arrests, underground groups continued to 
win new recruits to compensate for the loss.63 Since 
new students would enter universities each year, even 
if the military arrested all of the student leaders, an-
other group of students could easily replace those 
who had been arrested. Thus, student activism was 
not uprooted completely despite military repression. 
All of this suggests that students possessed a unique 
organizational capacity in Burmese society that al-
lowed them to fill the opposition vacuum despite state 
oppression. It also indicates that students might pos-
sess a unique organizational capacity under repressive 
regimes more generally.
Civil society: From actor constitution to mobilization
Student activists responded to campus control 
after the government crackdown of 1962 with under-
ground activities. With no room for formal structures, 
underground groups were essentially informal and 
unsystematic. Even so, however, underground activi-
ties were crucial to the process of actor constitution. 
In repressive states like Burma, this process is essen-
tial to sustaining mobilization capacity, constructing 
a revolutionary mindset among student activists, and 
passing on contentious claims from generation to gen-
eration because of the absence of formal, institutional 
channels for political claims. The creation and main-
tenance of a political identity among students through 
oppositional speech and on-campus underground 
mobilization allowed students to sustain and expand 
their sense of grievance against the regime and hence 
the extent of their activism.64 In the process, students 
achieved what theorists of contentious politics term 
“cognitive liberation,” the process by which students 
define a situation as “unjust and subject to change 
through group action.” 65 This, in turn, fostered a col-
lective understanding of the political situation among 
students and thus increased students’ potential for 
further recruitment and mobilization.66 
Underground activism: informal and unsystematic but 
united
Underground activities mainly came in the form 
79
legacy of the fighting peacock
of secret political study groups. Student Front Orga-
nization, for example, was one of the underground 
groups set up at Rangoon University in the 1960s with 
around ten active members, including lecturers who 
were former activists.67 These groups usually met 
once a month to discuss politics, education, student 
affairs, and independence history, and to make plans 
for spontaneous actions such as throwing anti-gov-
ernment pamphlets into people’s houses at night.68 
An unsystematic network of informal student groups 
was loosely maintained by personal connections, no-
tably “trustworthy childhood friends,” who, accord-
ing to activist leader and writer Lay Myint and 1970s 
student leader Htain Wynn Aung, were used as a pre-
caution against potential government spies. Messages 
were sent under very strict discipline due to security 
reasons.69 Pyone Cho confirmed that, in the 1980s 
as well, “[Student leaders] rebuilt RUSU based on es-
tablished trust and friendship among different under-
ground group members.”70
Actor constitution occurred when former stu-
dent activists with fighting and struggling experience 
led junior students in discussing the historic role of 
student activism (and other political activism) in 
Burma and distributing leaflets with contentious po-
litical claims, such as urging the military government 
to step down.71 As Johnston notes, such activities are 
“fundamental to the process of actor constitution in 
repressive states.”72 In Burma, oppositional political 
speech in secret study groups disseminated revolu-
tionary ideas, helped nourish a student activist iden-
tity, and gathered students to sustain mobilization 
capacity. The success of student groups in facilitating 
actor constitution helps explain students’ persistence 
under “the most persistent repression” among Asian 
countries.73
Additionally, Ne Win’s dictatorship served as a 
common enemy that helped unite the student popula-
tion toward a single goal: ending the dictatorship. Zaw 
Nyein Latt, a student leader in 1974, explained that, 
“We only [thought] of how to pull down the military 
government.” 74 The single-mindedness of student 
movements at this time allowed student activists from 
different ideological and ethnic backgrounds to join 
forces. This point is perhaps best illustrated by the fact 
that, in August 1988, student leader Min Ko Naing 
was able to unite leaders of different student groups—
including Maung Maung Kyaw from Burma Youth 
Liberation Front and Min Zay Ya of All Burma Stu-
dents Democratic Movement Organization—to call 
for the first national student conference since 1962.75 
The purpose of the conference was to resurrect the flag 
of the Fighting Peacock, which had belonged to the 
historic All Burma Federation of Student Unions. This 
conference demonstrated how the absence of pluralis-
tic views reinforced students’ solidarity and construct-
ed a shared identity among themselves in organizing 
collective actions. 
Underground student groups made use of Bur-
mese political history in order to construct a student 
activist identity. The historic role of students in the 
independence struggle, the heroism of General Aung 
San, and the later military resistance by the Thirty 
Comrades were just a few of the political legacies 
Burmese underground student groups drew upon to 
inspire young activists and generate devotion to un-
derground activism. Interestingly, student leaders co-
opted the legacy of General Aung San from the state as 
an integrating force for student activists. The military 
regime made use of the historical legacy of General 
Aung San—who led Burma’s independence through 
military struggle—to justify the legitimacy of “gover-
nance militarization.” General Aung San’s birthday and 
assassination were celebrated as Children’s Day and 
Martyrs’ Day, respectively. In addition, all bank notes 
were printed with the General’s picture from 1962 to 
1989.76 Despite that General Aung San had been uti-
lized as a symbol by the military regime, however, stu-
dent groups drew upon his legacy in order to contest 
the legitimacy of the state and unite student activists. 
Most of the student leaders truly believed that their 
participation and sacrifice, like General Aung San’s, 
could bring real change to Burma.77 As Robert Taylor 
explains, “[The] organization of students on university 
campuses [in 1988] echoed the tales of student hero-
ism in the 1930s taught to succeeding generations.”78
State violence also fostered a strong student po-
litical identity and radicalized many more moderate 
students. In March 1988, for example, many students 
witnessed the brutal treatment and arbitrary shoot-
ing of student protesters. On March 13, Phone Maw, 
a chemical engineering student at RIT, was shot dead 
by the riot police in a protest at a local police station 
against unfair treatment towards RIT students. In a 
subsequent protest on March 16, students were at-
tacked by the riot police near the Inya Lake in which 
hundreds died and thousands were arrested, known 
as the White Bridge Incident.79 Despite university 
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closure during this time period, many Burmese stu-
dent activists became more radical between March 
and May 1988. Students returned home and told oth-
ers how the military ruthlessly cracked down on stu-
dents’ peaceful demonstrations; in the process, they 
constructed the support base for the nationwide dem-
onstration that would take place that August. In the 
subsequent student mobilization, according to Phyo 
Min Thein and Pyone Cho, “virtually all students par-
ticipated, including moderates,” as students were very 
angry about state violence.80
Despite the limited membership base of each 
underground group, the existence of underground 
structures preserved students’ mobilization capacity. 
In 1974, when students learned about Ne Win’s igno-
rance toward the death of former United Nations Sec-
retary-General U Thant, underground groups started 
to communicate, gather, and mobilize students within 
two weeks to organize memorial activities and pro-
test against the military dictatorship.81 The general 
strike on August 8, 1988, was also a product of under-
ground discussion among student leaders from differ-
ent groups, who formed the general strike committee 
on June 23, two months before resuming the flag of 
ABFSU in late August.82 These examples demonstrate 
the ability of underground structures to mobilize stu-
dents at critical moments.
Analysis: The irreplaceable role of student activism
State actions acted as crucial political opportu-
nity structures that allowed student activism to take 
root more fully in Burma between 1962 and 1988. 
State repression eliminated every potential revolu-
tionary force in civil society except that of students, 
as students’ access to campuses gave them a unique 
advantage over other potential contentious actors. 
Therefore, while political input and output structures 
were highly restricted in Burma between 1962 and 
1988, students still had political opportunities that 
other groups did not and seized upon them to become 
Burma’s only anti-regime force during this period. 
Students’ relatively large political opportunities can 
best be explained by the fact that state repression cre-
ated an opposition vacuum in which students felt that 
they were the only group in society to challenge the re-
gime. However, the state’s socioeconomic mismanage-
ment also raised students’ incentives to act as agents 
of change. The processes of actor constitution, cogni-
tive liberation, and student mobilization, all of which 
are essential to cultivating politically contentious stu-
dents, were realized through underground activities. 
It is no exaggeration to conclude that students had an 
irreplaceable role in challenging the military regime 
between 1962 and 1988.
PHASE 2 (1988-2000S): THE EROSION OF 
STUDENT ACTIVISM
The 1988 Uprising ended in military repression. 
The military established the State Law and Order Res-
toration Council (SLORC) on September 18, 1988, and 
tightened political control across Myanmar. The exer-
tion of state control over education was the most nota-
ble reduction in political opportunities, as it strength-
ened political output structures. Despite the continued 
presence of an opposition vacuum as well as socioeco-
nomic mismanagement, the state effectively destroyed 
the foundation of student activism by weakening its 
mobilization capacity. Although underground groups 
were not entirely uprooted, it was difficult to organize 
students after 1988. A slight change in political output 
structures—Aung San Suu Kyi’s release in 1995, which 
was regarded as a signal of democratic change—helps 
explain why student protests took place in 1996 and 
1998, albeit on a small and confined scale.83 However, 
no student-led political movements have taken place 
in Myanmar since 1998.84
International level: sanctions and censorship
Myanmar’s isolation was reinforced after 1988 by 
international sanctions enacted in response to Myan-
mar’s severe human rights violations. Since 1990, the 
United States has imposed a range of economic sanc-
tions against Myanmar, including trade, assets, in-
vestment, and financial assistance restrictions.85 In 
addition to economic sanctions, the European Union 
adopted an arms embargo and suspended defense co-
operation with the country.86 These sanctions severe-
ly severed the limited connections that had existed 
between Myanmar and the rest of the world, such as 
foreign investment, and halted possible personal in-
teractions between citizens of Myanmar and citizens 
of other countries, which placed limits on potential 
interactions between Myanmar’s student groups and 
international actors. 
In addition, during this period, foreign media 
had a limited influence on student activism due to se-
vere censorship. Under Part (7) of the 1962 Printers 
and Publishers Registration Law, all newspapers and 
publications had to be scrutinized by the government. 
The Law Amending the Printers and Publishers Reg-
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istration Law, 1962 was enacted on June 18, 1989, to 
heighten the punishment for not complying with the 
law. For instance, the name of Nelson Mandela was 
removed from newspapers after his public call for re-
leasing Aung San Suu Kyi in 1993.87 Foreign broad-
casts were also restricted. A Myanmar government-
sponsored newspaper called the BBC a tool “to install 
British cronies in positions of power in Myanmar and 
through them to manipulate Myanmar political and 
economic life.”88 Following a BBC interview with 
Aung San Suu Kyi, in August 1995, the Myanmar gov-
ernment has restricted access to the BBC Burmese 
Service as well as the Voice of America.89
In addition, according to the International Tele-
communication Union, internet and mobile pen-
etrations were below 1% in Myanmar in 2006.90 
Affordable SIM cards were not available until very 
recently.91 As Chit Min Lay, a student leader in 1996, 
recalled, “It was difficult [for us] to reach the outside 
world when we were in university.”92 Thu Tha Sen, 
Managing Director of The Young Generation’s Note, a 
newspaper based along the Thailand-Myanmar bor-
der, and who spent her childhood in southern Myan-
mar (Mon State) in the 1990s and 2000s, said that she 
“didn’t even know who Aung San Suu Kyi [was] until 
I arrived in Yangon.”93 These examples illustrate the 
obstacles to communication and the free flow of ideas 
in Myanmar. Interestingly, among the ten student ac-
tivists from 1996 and 1998 I interviewed, only three 
mentioned Aung San Suu Kyi’s influence on their mo-
tivations in organizing the protests.94 Under such cir-
cumstances, the international environment could only 
have had a limited influence on the development of 
student activism in Myanmar during this phase.
State level: tightened control over university campuses
The state continued to shape the political oppor-
tunity structures of student activism after 1988, first by 
creating an anarchy-like situation, which significantly 
raised the cost of committing contentious political acts 
and eroded public support for the student movement, 
and then by tightening control over university cam-
puses and student activities (see Figure 3). Although 
non-student political actors emerged, they were basi-
cally dysfunctional under government repression, as 
was the case for the National League for Democracy, 
whose leaders, Aung San Suu Kyi, Tin Oo, and Win 
Tin, were arrested in July 1989.95 The military’s social 
and economic management did not improve during 
this period. Political input structures remained closed 
but political output structures became very strong, 
with tightened political control, particularly over edu-
cation. This reduction in political opportunity struc-
tures generated a sense of fear among students and 
detached them from anti-government activities. As a 
result, it was detrimental to student activism and con-
tributed to the gradual decline of student activism in 
Myanmar. 
Figure 3: Political Opportunity structures in Myanmar: 
1988 to 2000s
Hobbes’s dilemma: anarchy in action
After the largest democratic movement in Bur-
ma’s history took place on August 8, 1988, the military 
strategically created a “stateless” situation to prolong its 
rule and separate student activists from the support of 
ordinary people. Political output structures remained 
strong as the military intelligence continued to ar-
rest student activists and suppress opposition groups. 
Upon appointing Dr. Maung Maung to form a civilian 
government, the military purposefully compromised 
the “public good of social order” by withdrawing secu-
rity forces from streets and releasing 4,800 criminals 
from jails which succeeded to separate student activ-
ists from the support of ordinary people.96 Federico 
Ferrara described it as a twentieth-century applica-
tion of Hobbes’s dilemma.97 In Leviathan, Thomas 
Hobbes deduced the “natural condition of mankind,” 
or the state of nature, as “the time men live without a 
common Power to keep them all in awe.”98 In creating 
an anarchic situation in Burma, the military aimed to 
simulate a Hobbesian state of nature. 
In doing so, the state successfully generated a 
sense of fear among ordinary people and students, 
who ceased to participate in and support student ac-
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the state destroyed the support base of Burma’s stu-
dent groups. After more than a month of stateless an-
archy, ordinary people realized that the military was 
the only group in the country with the resources and 
capacity essential to enforcing law and order. After all, 
the military’s ability to do so is suggested by its name: 
the State Law and Order Restoration Council. At this 
time, the majority of Burmese thus stayed away from 
oppositional politics and submitted themselves to 
heightened repression in exchange for security. This 
explains the people’s silence—in stark contrast to the 
August 8 general strike—during the internal “coup” 
on September 18, 1988, by the military junta. It is at 
this point that we can begin to trace the decline of stu-
dent movements in Myanmar.99 The application of 
Hobbes’s dilemma in this analysis illustrates how state 
action shaped Myanmar’s political opportunity struc-
tures and led to the decline of student movements.
Tightening political control over education:  
separating students from university campuses
The 1988 Uprising alarmed the military about 
the underground mobilization capacity of students de-
spite their being under political control. As discussed 
earlier, the physical presence of a cluster of university 
campuses in Rangoon’s city center had served as a fo-
cal point for student activists to gather, organize, and 
mobilize.100 The State Law and Order Restoration 
Council thus targeted underground structures and 
imposed stricter controls to shatter the institutions 
that supported student activism. These measures in-
cluded university closures, campus relocations, and 
the introduction of distance learning, all while mili-
tary surveillance remained at a high level.101
The SLORC repeatedly shut down universities to 
prevent students from gathering. All universities were 
closed for three years after 1988.102 They reopened in 
June 1991, but closed again on December 10 of that 
year following a student demonstration celebrating 
Aung San Suu Kyi’s Nobel Peace Prize award.103 In 
1996, the military junta shut down universities again 
for four years following a student protest.104 From 
1988 to 2000, universities in Myanmar only opened 
for thirty-six to forty months.105 University closure 
effectively constrained the organization—and espe-
cially recruitment activities—of underground stu-
dent groups.106 Students were only able to organize 
in 1998 when some universities opened for ten days 
before examinations, which led to a small-scale pro-
test.107 This example demonstrates the importance of 
the university campus in providing a place for under-
ground structures to develop.
The military junta opened the University of Dis-
tance Education in Yangon in 1992 to supplement 
university education during campus closures.108 It 
encouraged students to transfer to this program by 
keeping daytime universities closed. As 1990s student 
leader Aung Kyaw Phyo attests, “Many students shifted 
to distance courses because they were not sure when 
[daytime] universities would reopen again.”109 Aung 
Kyaw Tun, former student leader of 1998 echoed, “This 
also allowed them to earn their living [while studying] 
in a period of economic hardship.”110 According to 
2002 figures, despite the fact that daytime universities 
had reopened in 2000, the daytime university students 
were limited in number (90,000 students) compared 
to the distance university students (560,000).111 With 
fewer students on campuses, underground groups had 
difficulty surviving, let alone mobilizing, in the 1990s 
and early 2000s.112  
Additionally, the military junta split and relocat-
ed existing universities, and established new univer-
sities—without student hostels—in remote locations 
far away from urban centers. While I was unable to 
interview former military intelligence officers to learn 
about their actual reasons for doing so, the military’s 
displacement of students nonetheless prevented the 
physical concentration of students that had promoted 
mobilization in the first phase.113 The number of stu-
dents at each university dropped significantly because 
of the split up and relocation after 1996. The govern-
ment also forced students to spend a long time on 
transportation—on average, three to four hours—so 
that they would have less time and energy to meet and 
organize after class.114 Yangon Technological Uni-
versity (formerly the Yangon Institute of Technology) 
was shut down in 1998 and replaced by the newly built 
Pyay Technological University in Bago Region.115 
The University of Yangon, which ceased to admit un-
dergraduates after 1996, was split into Dagon Uni-
versity, University of East Yangon, University of West 
Yangon and other institutions.
The prohibition of student hostels served an-
other purpose: to prevent students from building the 
close personal bonding and mutual trust that is inher-
ently crucial to underground activities. According to 
Hein Min Tun, a 2007 graduate of Yezin University of 
Veterinary Science, his university was one of the three 
exceptions that had “informal residence” for students 
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due to its remoteness.116 However, the 500 students 
of Yezin University were closely “monitored” by a mil-
itary base nearby and warned by teachers to “never do 
politics.”117 
Universities continued to operate under the ab-
solute control of government ministries over their 
curriculum, syllabus, and teachers. Students were 
taught to be “absolutely obedient to the authority” and 
were subjected to heightened levels of surveillance.118 
Military intelligence officers regularly and explicitly 
visited universities to check student activities.119 The 
existing informers’ network became systematic and 
comprehensive. Teachers were held responsible if they 
failed to report potential student activities.120 Former 
student leader Chit Min Lay recalled that some teach-
ers would remind students not to discuss politics on 
campus and in teashops, as “many colleagues [were] 
recording conversations.”121 Former student leaders 
Aung Kyaw Phyo, Khin Cho Myint, Nobel Aye, and 
Zin Mar Aung also alluded to the existence of the in-
formers’ network.122 Students continued to be hired 
as spies in the early 2000s. In 2004, a student who was 
a member of Generation Wave at Taungoo Technical 
University was arrested and, according to Hein Min 
Tun, his close friend was found to be the informer.123 
By hiring students as informers, the military built dis-
trust among students, who dared not discuss politics 
even with close friends. In general, the tightened mili-
tary surveillance and repression created a sense of fear 
among ordinary students. Large-scale student mo-
bilization became impossible even when there were 
underground structures in 1996 and 1998.124 Only a 
few hundred students in Yangon participated in both 
demonstrations.125
In short, the SLORC launched numerous policies, 
ostensibly to prevent students from gathering togeth-
er, organizing themselves, and mobilizing others. Es-
sentially, SLORC policies reduced the likelihood that 
underground movements would succeed (i.e., commit 
contentious acts without being arrested). As a result 
of this widening of political output structures, student 
activists were less likely to organize. The military re-
gime seems to have discovered the reason why student 
groups had been able to thrive under the opposition 
vacuum during the first phase: the existence of univer-
sity campuses provided them with an organizational 
capacity unavailable to other segments of civil society. 
Students thus had little incentive to get involved or 
had given up in student movements, as underground 
mobilizations were unlikely to succeed.126 
Confined changes in political opportunities in 1996 
and 1998
Under the dynamics of contention approach, 
the dominant incentive for students to participate in 
anti-government protests is expected success. Despite 
that this period can be characterized in general by a 
strengthening of political output structures (which re-
duced students’ expected successes), events in the late 
1990s slightly raised students’ expectations of success. 
Aung San Suu Kyi’s release in 1995 and her subsequent 
weekend political speeches outside her residence gave 
hope to students; in other words, the state’s release of 
Aung San Suu Kyi widened perceived opportunities 
for political action by making political input struc-
tures slightly more open. The NLD also gave students 
a message of support, which facilitated the process of 
actor constitution—the construction of a clear politi-
cal identity among student activists. Most of the stu-
dent leaders, including Aung Kyaw Phyo, Nobel Aye 
and Zin Mar Aung, thus calculated that a “final battle” 
and sacrifice could bring a real impact and “realized 
[it was] the time to reorganize,” as they had very high 
expectations that the NLD could generate a democrat-
ic transition.127 The NLD’s statement on August 21, 
1998, had been spread through leaflets and personal 
connections, and was interpreted by the student lead-
ers as a signal that the “People’s Parliament” would be 
called “within a few days.”128 It directly encouraged 
students to demonstrate; as Aung Kyaw Phyo recalled, 
“We expected to stay in prison for just a few months” 
given the NLD’s “expected success in [a] power transi-
tion.”129
Civil society: a decline in underground activities
In addition to effective political control over 
education, the absence of former student leaders—
who were either in jail or in exile—from university 
campuses was detrimental to the sustainability of un-
derground student group structures. Without having 
seniors to recruit new members, the construction of 
a student political identity through discussion and 
mobilization around contentious claims became very 
difficult. In other words, the existence of a “lost gen-
eration” of student leaders undermined the process 
of actor constitution and cognitive liberation among 
students. As a result, student groups failed to “rede-
fine perceptions of threats and opportunities” among 
students, which Johnston explains is crucial to mobi-
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lizing contentious action.130
A “generation gap” and reduction in mobilization 
capacity
As demonstrated earlier, an important element 
in the actor constitution of student activism between 
1962 and 1988 had been its overwhelming emphasis 
on passing the torch and inspiring the next generation 
by channeling the legacies of previous generations. 
Fifteen former student leaders from 1962, 1974, 1988, 
1996, and 1998 explained that Burmese student move-
ments have been a combination of both former stu-
dent leaders and new students who learned from ex-
perienced seniors in underground political discussion 
and secret meetings.131 According to and Khin Cho 
Myint, Pyone Cho, Zaw Nyein Latt, seniors would help 
the new members “turn their demands and discontent 
into politics,” which helped develop a Burmese stu-
dent activist identity.132 It usually started with low-
risk activities, such as distributing leaflets and music 
tapes, as a form of training.133 Former student lead-
ers also had an imperative role in recruitment. “They 
identified potential candidates, discussed politics with 
them, checked their backgrounds, and eventually gave 
the flag to suitable students,” former student activist 
Zaw Nyein Latt recalled.134
After 1988, however, student leaders were ei-
ther in jail or in exile.135 This created a shortage in 
experienced seniors who could guide the new gen-
eration. In other words, a “generation gap” emerged. 
No prominent leaders were released until the early 
2000s.136 The remaining activists fled to Thailand and 
formed exile groups, such as the ABFSU Foreign Af-
fairs Committee based in Chiang Mai, Thailand, and 
the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) 
based along the border.137 In the absence of seniors, 
political recruitment and training in contentious poli-
tics abated.138 As actor constitution and cognitive 
liberation became limited, the mobilization capacity 
of student activism could no longer be sustained by 
underground activities. 
The 1996 and 1998 student demonstrations were 
possible partly because of the release of 427 and 163 
political prisoners in 1992 and 1995, respectively.139 
The majority of them were former student activists 
in the 1988 Uprising who then continued to study in 
universities and organize with the younger genera-
tion (i.e., high school students who were merely fol-
lowers).140 However, the organizational structures 
of underground activities were gradually uprooted 
after 1998, when most of the student activists from 
the 1990s (such as Aung Kyaw Phyo, Aung Kyaw Tun, 
Chit Min Lay, Khin Cho Myint, Nobel Aye, and Zin 
Mar Aung), were either in jail or in exile. 141 Once 
this had occurred, no one could stay and lead the re-
maining students. Clearly, actions at the civil society 
level could not take place during this period, as events 
at the state level highly reduced the potential for col-
lective action among university students.
Analysis: State actions and a decline in student activism
From 1988 through the early 2000s, the military 
junta had a predominant role in transforming the 
political opportunity structures that were previously 
favorable to student activism, thereby altering the dy-
namics of contention between student activists and 
the state. The state effectively minimized the possibil-
ity for students to organize anti-government activities 
through exerting a very strong control over the educa-
tional system, i.e., strengthening a vital political output 
structure that had earlier allowed student movements 
to develop. It utilized a variety of methods—from uni-
versity closure and relocation, to distance education 
and military intelligence—to extinguish the spark of 
student activism before it could take shape in the form 
of a threat to the regime’s stability. These measures 
significantly reduced students’ chances to succeed, 
and hence, lowered their incentives to put their lives 
at risk. Even though the elements of student historic 
heroism did not entirely fade away, underground ac-
tivities faded tremendously by the early 2000s, as most 
of the student activists were either in jail or in exile. 
In sum, the state orchestrated the gradual decline of 
student activism in Burma after 1988.
PHASE 3 (2000S-PRESENT):
THE GROWTH OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
In 2005, the military junta released 361 political 
prisoners, including Min Ko Naing and Ko Ko Gyi, the 
two most prominent student leaders of the 1988 Up-
rising.142 Together with other former student leaders, 
they founded the 88 Generation Students’ Group (88 
Generation) and played a crucial role in the monk-led 
Saffron Revolution in 2007. In contrast to the move-
ments discussed in Phases 1 and 2, this movement 
was marked by limited student participation. How-
ever, as a response to Cyclone Nargis in 2008, which 
killed over 138,000 people, many youth relief groups 
emerged and raised students’ awareness of commu-
nity service.143 
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In this period, a civilian government comprised 
of former generals replaced the State Peace and De-
velopment Council (SPDC), which was dissolved 
on March 30, 2011.v This officially marked a transi-
tion period for Myanmar and is the most significant 
change in political opportunity structures observed 
thus far. Most student leaders arrested in 2007 were 
released by early 2012. The aboveground ABFSU, Fed-
eration of Student Unions (FoSU) and University Stu-
dents’ Union (USU) were then organized. However, 
the opening of political space and enlargement of civil 
society eliminated the opposition vacuum, resulting in 
the students’ losing their monopoly status as the sole 
opposition group.
International level: Limited global connections
Under the new civilian government, Myanmar is 
less isolated than before. In recognition of the reform 
process that began in 2011, international sanctions 
have been gradually lifted. The United States dropped 
its ban on foreign investment in Myanmar and the 
European Union suspended all restrictive measures 
except its arms embargo.144 With improved Internet 
access and increased exchange opportunities, students 
are more aware of developments abroad such as the 
recent student strike in Hong Kong known as the 
“umbrella movement.” In March 2014, The ASEAN 
Youth Forum was held in Myanmar for the first time.
However, student groups in Myanmar are largely 
independent of foreign influence and lack political 
connections. Neither FoSU nor USU have internation-
al networks. Only student groups in exile have formal 
international connections. ABSDF is a member of the 
International Union of Students, but the organiza-
tion has been inactive, with its last updates released 
on November 18, 2002.145 Another example of stu-
dent groups’ limited international engagement is the 
attendance of the ABFSU Foreign Affairs Committee 
at a regional student conference in New Delhi in 2009 
alongside member organizations of the World Fed-
eration of Democratic Youth.146 Within Myanmar, 
ABFSU has no formal connections with international 
student organizations due to the organization’s “non-
existence” prior to its latest reorganization in early 
2012. Since then, ABFSU has occasionally partici-
pated in regional functions; for instance, Phyo Phyo 
Aung and Han Nee Oo, members of ABFSU’s Central 
Working Committee, participated in a political work-
v  The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was renamed the 
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997.
shop organized by the International Union of Socialist 
Youth in the Philippines in January 2014.147 Even so, 
neither student activist is a daytime university student 
anymore.
International influences on student activism are 
still limited. Although international political move-
ments may serve as a source of inspiration for the 
student groups in Myanmar, there is no strong evi-
dence of formal and informal ties between Burmese 
student groups and their foreign counterparts at the 
moment.148 The end of Myanmar’s isolation, how-
ever, means that students are increasingly exposed to 
foreign ideas and events, a development that deserves 
investigation in future studies.
State level: State-driven political and economic 
developments
The state continued to repress political groups 
and arrest activists during the Saffron Revolution in 
2007 and the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in 2008. 
However, a remarkable change in POS started in 2011 
when the transition period began (see Figure 4). Al-
though the government still holds absolute control 
over university administration, the political control 
on student organizations has been largely reduced, 
especially after 2013. According to Nyein Chan May, 
Vice Chairman of Yangon University of Foreign Lan-
guages Students’ Union (YUFLSU), the university 
has been more lenient on student organizations, “at 
least we are allowed to exist in campus and operate 
above-ground.”149 Min Thu Kyaw, Secretary-General 
of Yangon Institute of Economics Students’ Union, 
echoed, “Sometimes members of the university [ad-
ministration] may even join our Discussion Club.”150 
For instance, on July 6, 2012, the eve of the 50th an-
niversary of military’s bombing of the RUSU Build-
ing, police detained 23 members of ABFSU for one 
day to prevent them from mobilizing students to join 
a memorial.151 A year later, students were allowed 
to march inside the University of Yangon and in the 
streets.152 This decline in government repression of 
student activism represents a notable weakening of 
political output structures.
The opposition vacuum ceased to exist with the 
gradual end of suppression through measures like the 
legalization of political parties and CSOs. This open-
ing of the political space has allowed civil society to 
develop and has prevented students from taking lead-
ership over the democratic transition. The state is also 
opening its economy for foreign investment and trade. 
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At present, political input structures in Myanmar have, 
for the first time in since 1962, become more open. 
Figure 4: Political opportunity structures in Myanmar: 
late-200s to today
The gradual opening of political space: the end of the 
opposition vacuum
The SPDC tactfully controlled the opposition af-
ter 2007 to provide a stable and peaceful environment 
for the referendum on the new Constitution in 2008, 
the parliamentary election in 2010, and the final state-
led reform in 2011 to “[build] a modern, developed 
and democratic nation by the state leaders elected by 
the Hluttaw (Parliament).”vi These political changes 
were in accordance with the “Roadmap to Discipline-
flourishing Democracy” adopted in 2003.153 The 
military jailed former student leaders and the 2007 
generation following the Saffron Revolution, and 
civil society activists in 2008. Among those arrested 
in 2008 were Phyo Phyo Aung and her father Dr. Nay 
Win, a student activist of 1988. They were arrested for 
organizing the collection of bodies of Cyclone Nargis 
victims for burial.154
Civil society started to develop in 2008 when 
many CSOs emerged to perform community service 
in response to the government’s incapability to pro-
vide disaster relief. From 2010 onwards, the rule of law 
began to supplant brute force as the modus operandi 
of the state, which started to open up political space 
within its control. Under Section 6 (b) and (c) of the 
Political Parties Registration Law enacted on March 
8, 2010, registered political parties have to safeguard 
“law and order and tranquillity” and the Constitution. 
vi  According to the translation in the Myanmar government-owned 
newspaper, The New Light of Myanmar.
Section 354 of the 2008 Constitution states the con-
ditions of citizens’ constitutional freedom of associ-
ation—“not contrary to the laws, enacted for Union 
security, prevalence of law and order, community 
peace and tranquillity or public order and morality”—
which, in practice, gives the government legal power 
to arbitrarily limit such freedom. Nonetheless, it pro-
vides a legal basis for political parties to operate above 
ground. As of April 4, 2014, sixty-three political par-
ties are registered, including the opposition NLD and 
the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party 
(USDP) consists of former generals.155
The state also intends to relax the registration of 
CSOs, which will facilitate the growth of civil society. 
Section (6) of the Law Relating to Forming of Organi-
zations enacted on September 30, 1988, prohibits or-
ganizations from political activities and punishes such 
activity with imprisonment for up to five years. The 
non-transparent registration process requires a high 
fee of 500,000 Kyat and requires long waiting time. vii 
For instance, Ratana Metta Organisation waited for 
two years and “had to promise to do only social af-
fairs.”156 On January 24, 2014, the government sub-
mitted the drafted Association Registration Law to the 
Parliament with voluntary registration provisions, a 
certificate processing time of between 30 and 60 days, 
a maximum registration fee of 30,000 Kyat, and a right 
to appeal. viii Over 300 local CSOs have registered 
since 2012.157 Such growth would not have been pos-
sible without state-led reforms.
Although government control persists, politi-
cal parties and CSOs can now be formally and legally 
established. This has ended the opposition vacuum 
previously filled by students. Four of my interviews 
suggest that people no longer look to them (student 
leaders) but to prominent political figures such as 
Aung San Suu Kyi and the 1988 leaders who have the 
capacity to make a real difference.158 The ABFSU 
that re-emerged in 2012 was not as attractive as it 
was before. The students’ capacity to act as the politi-
cal vanguard has largely reduced. The political role of 
student groups has been replaced by political parties 
and CSOs, particularly by the NLD and 88 Genera-
tion. The role of students has become less important.
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Economic developments: the higher opportunity cost 
of political participation
Myanmar’s “open door policy” has raised the 
opportunity cost of political participation for stu-
dents. Myanmar’s economic situation has improved. 
GDP rose from $6.5 billion in 1998 to $53.1 billion in 
2012.159 Although the mismatch between university 
education and job opportunities is still severe, stu-
dents have more choices than before, such as studying 
abroad and working in international organizations. 
Three of my interviews suggest that, with better ca-
reer prospects and economic opportunities, current 
students have fewer incentives to risk their lives in po-
litical movements.160 The state has created better so-
cioeconomic conditions, which have turned students 
away from politics. As Hpone Myint Thu, a student 
at the University of Medicine in Yangon from 2009 to 
2010, remarked, “Economic issues are considered [by 
students] as more important than political issues.”161
Education remains under state control
Although the government has relaxed its control 
of the education system, it continues to undermine 
students’ prospect of success (i.e., incentives) to en-
gage in contentious political acts, and constrain their 
organizational capacity.162
At present, university campuses are in general 
freely accessible. Since 2011, some universities have 
even invited prominent civil society leaders to give 
guest lectures on social issues that indirectly touched 
political issues.163 The University of Yangon reopened 
on December 5, 2013, with the first 1,000 undergradu-
ate students since 1996, undertaking nineteen arts and 
science degree programs including a political science 
program in collaboration with Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity.164
However, some universities under government 
control state in their admissions forms that students 
must “promise not to participate in union or political 
affairs.”165 This sends a clear signal to the students: 
there is a cost to engage in political activities, which 
discourages them to do so.166 The government has 
further proposed the establishment of the Central 
University Council to control higher education, which 
would consist of ministry officials and rectors (75 per-
cent), academia (9 percent), private schools (7 per-
cent), CSOs (4 percent), administrative staff (3 per-
cent), one lecturer and one student.167 Although the 
issue is still in debate among policy makers and stake-
holders, the government’s proposal has shown that the 
state is still in control over universities despite having 
somewhat relaxed political control. To date, university 
administrations are still under the hierarchical, top-
down control of government ministries. Institutional, 
financial, academic, and curricular autonomy are ab-
sent.168 Furthermore, the government is particularly 
concerned about the presence of the 2007 student 
leaders on university campuses. At least seventeen 
former political prisoners from ABFSU were either 
expelled or daytime education. For instance, Phyo 
Phyo Aung, a civil engineering student at the Tech-
nological University (Hmawbi) in 2007, was expelled, 
and Han Nee Oo, a law student at Dagon University in 
2007, was forced to switch to distance learning after 
being released in 2012.169 Si Thu Maung is the only 
exception, as the Ministry of Education allowed him 
to resume his studies at the Yangon Institute of Eco-
nomics in December 2013. The remote locations of 
campuses and the large number of students undertak-
ing distance education continue to make it difficult for 
students to gather for political activities. Dormitories 
are only provided in a limited scale, while students 
studying away from their homes account for over 70 
percent of the country’s total student population.170 
Universities are generally closed within one to two 
hours after class.ix These government policies serve to 
limit students’ capacity to organize collective actions 
by undermining the prospect of success, likelihood of 
the process of actor constitution and formulation of a 
student political identity.
State-influenced decline in students’ political activism
The state has successfully instilled a sense of fear 
among students to deter them from engaging in po-
litical activities. Students’ parents have often been wit-
nesses to the military’s bloody repression in the past 
and, consequently, many students do not dare to par-
ticipate in political movements. Such activities could 
result in the whole family being sent to prison.171 In 
fact, many of the 2007 student leaders and current stu-
dent group members were born into “political fami-
lies.” For instance, the fathers of Phyo Phyo Aung and 
Han Nee Oo of ABFSU, as well those of D Nyein Lin of 
FoSU and Nyein Chan May of YUFLSU, were former 
student leaders and activists in 1974 and 1988.172
Moreover, for half a century, Myanmar’s mili-
tary junta sustained itself through “propaganda, sur-
veillance and fear,” the effects of which outlived the 
ix  The author personally paid a half-day visit to Yangon Institution of 
Economics during a regular school day on January 9, 2014.
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junta itself.173 Even in 2007, people still believed that 
military intelligence officers were everywhere, trans-
mitting public conversations to generals’ ears, and 
such fear discouraged political action.174 Moreover, 
with the decline of underground student discussion 
groups, which used to counterbalance government 
propaganda, the military junta depoliticized students 
through education and propaganda that promoted 
ideas such as “politics is dangerous” and “politics is 
adults’ business.” Additionally, the imprisonment of 
hundreds of students in the past has made students 
reluctant to engage in political action. Consequently, 
“pretending to be obedient [to authority] is a norm 
among students.”175 After decades of military repres-
sion, students are still skeptical of the growing political 
freedom. Only six students chose political science—a 
subject in which there were fifty available seats—at the 
University of Yangon in this year’s reopening to un-
dergraduates, as the subject is still considered to be 
controversial and to have dim career prospects.176 
According to many student leaders, the most chal-
lenging obstacle to student group recruitment and 
mobilization is the sense of fear among students re-
garding political participation.177
The absence of pressing political storms to act as 
triggers also restrains students’ incentive to engage in 
political action. Students have less of an incentive to 
organize along political lines without having experi-
enced direct suffering under Ne Win’s dictatorship.178 
As Myanmar is changing and seemingly becoming 
more democratic, students do not see the urgent need 
to agitate against the government. The country has 
ceased, at least in official terms, to be ruled by the 
junta. It is thought to be unrealistic to start a revolu-
tion. Students thus have few incentives to participate 
in political movements.
Civil society: Divergence among student activists
When the reform process began in 2011, diver-
gence emerged between student groups, which proved 
damaging to the ability of student groups to mobilize 
in concert with one another. There is also a shift of 
focus from political issues to community service.
The re-emergence of on-campus student groups
On August 28, 2007, four students studying Eng-
lish at the United States Embassy’s American Cen-
ter—Kyaw Ko Ko, Si Thu Maung, Han Nee Oo and 
Lin Htet Naing—began a new incarnation of ABFSU 
under the guidance of former student leaders released 
in 2005.179 As it was very difficult to in the absence 
of underground structures to recruit students on cam-
puses, which were still under political control, the 
four students drew twenty members from the Ameri-
can Center.180 However, it was very difficult for ABF-
SU to cultivate a student political identity because it 
lacked links with current students. Thus, actor consti-
tution, cognitive liberation and student mobilization 
were limited. Less than 10 percent of the protestors in 
2007 were students.181 This further proves the indis-
pensable role of underground activities in sustaining 
students’ mobilization capacity and the military’s suc-
cess in destroying the foundations of student activism 
after 1988.
Most of the student leaders of ABFSU in 2007 
were jailed afterwards and released by January 2012. 
Making use of the change in political input structures, 
the more open political space, ABFSU regrouped again 
and founded the 12-person Central Working Com-
mittee (CWC) on January 18, 2012. With no existing 
campus networks, they were unable to recruit daytime 
university students. Even today, none of the CWC 
members are daytime university students. In time, 
members within the group began to disagree about 
the group’s approach, emphasis, and organization. 
In March 2012, D Nyein Lin, the former Vice Chair-
man of ABFSU, quit ABFSU; he subsequently formed 
FoSU on June 1, 2012.182 USU is another student 
group but acts as a network rather than a centralized 
organization, and does not have a known founding 
date. In USU, students’ unions of various universities 
“group together by consensus.”183 The establishment 
of the Yangon Institute of Economics Students’ Union 
(YIESU) on July 6, 2012, was extraordinarily signifi-
cant. Not only was it the first students’ union within 
the USU network. It was the first on-campus student 
group to operate since the 1990s. In addition, mem-
bers of USU are necessarily current students.
Divergence among student groups: student 
pragmatism and a shift of focus
The opening of political space has eliminated the 
opposition vacuum and promoted the proliferation of 
multiple sources of student agitation. In addition, the 
end of military rule has reduced both state repression 
and the incentives for many students to press for po-
litical change beyond education reforms. This could 
explain the greater influence of student groups such as 
USU that focus on university-based issues relative to 
student groups such as ABFSU that advocate broader 
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political change.
The split of FoSU and USU from ABFSU illus-
trates the divisions within the student population it-
self. Despite sharing a desire for peace and democratic 
development, the three student groups diverged in 
emphasis (university affairs vs. political activities), ap-
proach (negotiation vs. confrontation) and organiza-
tional structure (bottom-up and independent vs. top-
down and centralized). While political opportunity 
structures will be used to understand the divergence 
in approach and emphasis, actor constitution will be 
used to study that of organization. 
Emphasis and approach
To start with, ABFSU focuses on political activi-
ties and activism. It maintains a certain distance from 
the government given its substantial distrust of the 
government as a result of the military’s poor record 
(e.g., its refusal to transfer power following the 1990 
election). Members restrain from “negotiation and 
compromise” to remain consistent with the student 
activist tradition of anti-government tactics. It has not 
conducted any formal negotiation with the govern-
ment so far.184 
Meanwhile, USU separates student rights and 
university affairs from political activities, while em-
phasizing the former. This position can be seen in a 
comment made by Nyein Chan May, a leading mem-
ber of USU and Vice Chairman of YUFLSU: “politi-
cization alienates many ordinary students who still 
consider politics as a dangerous adults’ business.”185 
Min Thu Kyaw, another leading member of USU and 
Secretary-General of YIESU, also stressed the neces-
sity of “compromise and negotiation.”186 
FoSU positions itself in between the other two 
student groups, considering student rights as a pre-
condition to political engagement, which is currently, 
according to D Nyein Linn, President of FoSU, “be-
yond students’ capacity.”187 However, FoSU still 
adopts a dual approach involving both participation 
in both government meetings and street protests to 
“engage those who are ready [in politics].”188
Various examples illustrate the divisions among 
the groups. On August 8, 2013, 88 Generation invited 
government officials to the twenty-fifth anniversary 
memorial of the 1988 Uprising as a form of outreach. 
While FoSU and USU joined the memorial, ABFSU 
refused to attend due to its reluctance to stand on the 
same stage with former generals. According to Phone 
Pye Khwel, the Foreign Affairs Officer of ABFSU, 
“ABFSU would not participate before the government 
apologizes and recognizes the movement.”189 Simi-
larly, when 88 Generation demonstrated against Sec-
tion 18 of the Law on Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful 
Procession on January 5, 2014, ABFSU did not par-
ticipate because 88 Generation followed the law by 
seeking police permission to protest. Phone Pye Kh-
wel explained that ABFSU “[has] to be consistent...
and should challenge the unjust law by civil disobe-
dience.”190 However, a third example shows the dif-
ferent relationship between the USU and political 
engagement. Only student groups affiliated with USU 
were invited by the Ministry of Education to “send 
student representatives” to government meetings on 
higher education reforms in December 2013 and Janu-
ary 2014.191 Although students’ unions have not been 
officially recognized by the government since 1962, 
this demonstrates the government’s commitment to 
encouraging students to work within the system by 
opening up political input structures.  
Such divergence reflects the increasingly plural-
istic nature of Burmese society, now featuring a broad-
er political spectrum and more diversified interests. 
The elimination of an opposition vacuum means that 
students not only lose the advantage as the only oppo-
sition group in civil society, but also holds diversified 
views among themselves. Without a single student 
group uniting the student population outside the sys-
tem, political mobilization capacity and hence threat 
to the government diminished.
Organizational structure
As the opposition vacuum faded away, a vibrant 
civil society gradually emerged in Myanmar. The state 
became less repressive in terms of political output 
structures, which meant that students were less likely 
to take on political and anti-government issues but 
pluralistic claims. No longer having a single unifying 
goal, students were less incentivized to unite within 
one leadership structure, since they were able to form 
and join groups that represented their more specific 
viewpoints. The process of actor constitution had 
turned from a political-activist identity to an educa-
tion-and-social-service identity.
The three student groups are now at a primitive 
stage of internal organization, as reflected in their 
small membership base. This undermines the process 
of actor constitution, cognitive liberation, and hence, 
student mobilization. Although the USU is better 
organized as a site of mobilization than either the 
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ABFSU, it focuses on education over political issues, 
which limits the type of identity it cultivates among 
student actors. ABFSU aims to develop a single stu-
dent organization and group all students’ unions at 
district level under its flag for united collective ac-
tions. As of January 2014, ABFSU covers 26 out of 
38 districts in the seven regions, including Nay Pyi 
Daw (the capital), Southern Yangon (Yangon region), 
Maubin (Ayeyarwady region), Magway (Magway re-
gion) and Monywa (Sagaing region).192 Despite its 
wide geographical coverage, ABFSU’s ability to mobi-
lize and influence current students is limited. As men-
tioned, none of ABFSU’s CWC members are current 
daytime students. Without direct linkages with stu-
dents at universities, it is difficult for ABFSU to “truly 
understand students’ needs and concerns” and earn 
their trust.193 This is a major obstacle for ABFSU to 
recruit members and hence construct a student-activ-
ist identity among them. 
Although a considerable number of District 
Committee members are current students, they have 
a limited influence on other students, since “some 
[students] are even reluctant to sit with and talk to 
[ABFSU members]” due to fears of political involve-
ment.194 Perhaps most importantly, each District 
Committee only consists of ten to thirty members.195 
Even while activists within ABFSU had declared 
themselves “student leaders,” ordinary students were 
dissatisfied with ABFSU’s poor representation of the 
actual student population, which greatly impedes the 
organization’s ability to cultivate a student political 
identity. These are all detrimental for ABFSU’s abil-
ity to sustain the process of actor constitution, as the 
students they are purporting to represent are in fact 
dispersed among multiple groups.
On the other hand, according to D Nyein Lin, 
FoSU envisions a “federal system” of students’ unions 
under a “students’ parliament.”196 It adopts a three-
step approach to “sow the seeds of democracy in stu-
dent life:” enlightenment, capacity-building, and ac-
tion.197 But it has no outstanding progress so far. For 
almost two years, students have yet to be inspired to 
set up unions under FoSU. This suggests that FoSU’s 
bottom-up approach is too idealistic in Myanmar’s 
politically apathetic student community. As a re-
sult, its ability to cultivate a student-activist identity 
through contentious practices is very limited. 
The organizational principle of USU allows stu-
dents’ unions within its network to have different 
policies while seeking cooperation in activities and 
statements. It maintains diversification and denies the 
necessity to organize under one flag.198 Since it com-
prises current students who have a physical presence 
on university campuses, these unions have relatively 
more members and therefore USU has a greater po-
tential for student mobilization and actor constitution 
than the other two groups. As of January 2014, eight 
unions in Yangon have joined the USU network.199 
Among them, YIESU has 200 members out of 5,500 
students, DUSU has 200 members out of 30,000 stu-
dents, and YUFLSU, which was newly established 
on 1 June 2013, has 50 active volunteers out of 2,000 
students.200 Additionally, two unions under USU, 
the Myanmar Maritime University Students’ Union 
(MMUSU) and YIESU, held the first two elections 
of students’ unions within a university campus since 
1962 in January and February 2014. These elections 
were promoted online and on campus through “voter 
education” and election campaigns.201 These efforts 
gave the unions a sense of legitimacy that ABFSU 
lacked and helped garner student support. However, 
that being said, USU is still at an early stage of orga-
nization with limited members (relative to the total 
student population) and mobilization capacity. For 
instance, YUFLSU had to call off a campaign against 
China’s dam construction project in Northern Myan-
mar scheduled for March 2014 because it still needed 
to draft a constitution and recruit members.202 
The relatively higher influence and member-
ship of USU over the other student groups represents 
a clear shift in focus from anti-government political 
campaigns to education reform, university affairs, 
and community service. In fact, USU is construct-
ing a student identity based on non-political issues, 
which represents an alternative actor constitution, 
with the potential to mobilize students to engage in 
“education activism.”
From an organizational perspective, student 
groups under USU tend to avoid being too political 
in order to keep their organizations alive and attract 
more students to participate. They focus on issues 
that directly affect students’ lives. Campus petitions 
about university affairs have been common in recent 
years, especially those rejecting increases in motor-
bike parking fees and school bus fares.203 Even some 
ABFSU members attempted to follow when they be-
gan to operate the Wings Capacity Building School in 
November 2013. Currently, it offers a range of non-
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political activities, from free Wi-Fi to English and 
Japanese classes, in order to attract students to gather 
at the school for possible collective actions in the fu-
ture.204
With the rise of USU, social and volunteering 
activities have largely replaced anti-government po-
litical campaigns. For instance, YIESU organized a 
fundraising campaign for poor families on Full Moon 
Day in September 2013 and a campaign for the Global 
Day of Humanity in March 2014.205 Furthermore, 
the existing political activities, such as holding me-
morials, aim at raising awareness, rather than launch-
ing substantial actions. For example, YIESU cooper-
ated with DUSU to initiate the first memorial events 
on the military’s bombing of RUSU Building on July 
7 and Martyrs’ Day on July 19, 2013, in Yangon.206 
On January 4, 2014—Independence Day—YUFL-
SU, together with activists from the Yangon School 
of Political Science, distributed the Independence 
Statement in Maha Bandoola Park, where the Inde-
pendence Monument is located.x Similarly, DUSU 
also held a memorial drama on General Aung San’s 
birthday on February 13, 2014. Another one of USU’s 
semi-political activities is YIESU’s Discussion Club. 
In late December 2013, YIESU established the first 
aboveground, on-campus Discussion Club in Myan-
mar in fifty years with the passive consent of univer-
sity authorities. With discussion topics such as “Is 
what adults say always correct?” student leaders aim 
at stimulating students’ critical thinking with limited 
political elements on a weekly basis.xi The Discussion 
Club regularly attracts hundreds of students. In recent 
years, students have become more pragmatic. Despite 
the decline of opposition vacuum and subsequent 
growth of political space (indeed, perhaps because 
of it), most students are politically inactive and have 
been more inclined to concentrate on career goals and 
future prospects.207 Students tend to have a substan-
tial interest in student rights, university affairs, and 
education issues that directly impact their lives. The 
majority of student groups argue that students’ unions 
should work solely on student affairs rather than po-
litical activities, which should be the business of po-
litical parties and CSOs. This distinction is new, and 
has resulted from the growth of civil society and lack 
x  The author personally joined the students in distributing leaflets to local 
people on January 4, 2014.
xi  The author personally attended the Discussion Club as a guest speaker 
on January 9, 2014. I was asked “not to talk too politically in order to avoid 
frightening the students.” Myanmar students were generally interested in Hong 
Kong’s campus (especially hostel) life and how foreigners view Myanmar.
of an opposition vacuum. As many student leaders 
have proclaimed, “SU [students’ union] is for the stu-
dents.”208 In addition, students share different views 
on the notion of “responsibility” compared with the 
previous generations. Students have an impression 
that revolution cannot make a difference or rebuild 
the country, for, as civil society activist Sit Maw points 
out, “Nothing has been changed after 1988 even with 
huge sacrifice”.209 Instead, students have developed a 
more influential role in social issues, as evidenced by 
the rapid growth of youth NGOs after Cyclone Nargis 
in 2008. Youth NGOs support a wide range of causes, 
including capacity-building movements, humanitar-
ian aid, rural empowerment, and think tanks.210 For 
example, the Myanmar Youth Union, founded in De-
cember 2011, collaborated with many CSOs, includ-
ing 88 Generation, Burma Centre for Ethnic Studies 
and Triangle Women Support Group, on capacity-
building programs.211 Such collaborations embody 
students’ current interpretation of “young peoples’ 
responsibility.”
Analysis: From Burma’s political vanguard to  
one of many groups in an emerging civil society
Phases of political development directly influ-
ence the intensity and nature of student activism, 
including the form of government and availability of 
non-student political actors. State control (2000s to 
2011) and gradual reforms (2011 to today) continue to 
shape political opportunities that constrain students’ 
incentives and capacity to act as agents of political 
change.
The reform process puts an end to the opposition 
vacuum and gradually produces a controlled political 
space for non-student opposition to develop. Students 
are no longer irreplaceable. The general public look for 
prominent political parties and CSOs, especially those 
established by former student leaders who served in 
prisons for decades, as recognition of their sacrifice 
that earned them legitimacy and public popularity. 
Today, Min Ko Naing remains a symbol of democracy 
and student activism despite disappearing from public 
eyes for twenty years.212 Current students can hardly 
be comparable to them. Since students no longer rep-
resent people’s pluralistic demands, the public has no 
incentive to submit themselves to the leadership of 
current students.
Divergence among student groups emerged as a 
product of the widening political spectrum. The ability 
of CSOs to openly and freely organize means that they 
92
columbia university journal of politics & society
can diversify and represent multiple interests, unlike 
in the past, when underground groups had only one 
major aim: overthrowing the government. In the early 
formulations of political opportunity structures, both 
Eisinger and Tilly suggested how significant threats 
could inspire opposition groups to cooperate and mo-
bilize.213 In her research on student movements in 
the United States from 1930 to 1990, Nella Van Dyke 
explained the ability of threats and grievances to fos-
ter cooperation and “inspire within-movement coali-
tion work” among student groups.214 After the end 
of military rule, it is less likely for students to feel the 
need to unite as a single entity against repression. 
Nevertheless, the growth of civil society provid-
ed politically aware students with more choices. For 
instance, some former student activists in 2007 joined 
NLD’s newly established youth wing, which aims to 
recruit 60,000 to 100,000 young people under the age 
of thirty-five to prepare them for future parliamentary 
elections.215 Student activism is no longer the only 
option.
In short, students lost their monopoly over the 
political opposition in Myanmar. Political parties and 
CSOs replace students’ role as the political vanguard 
to press for democratic transition. Students are in a 
position to struggle for their roles and identities in 
the transition period. As former student leader Aung 
Kyaw Tun commented, “The current generation no 
longer enjoy the monopoly of challenging the govern-
ment.”216
CONCLUSION: A HISTORICAL PRODUCT IN AN 
OPPOSITION VACUUM
Student activists as unique contentious actors
Using the dynamics of contention framework, 
this study illustrates how, through state repression, 
authoritarian regimes can inadvertently (and perhaps 
counterintuitively) expand political opportunities for 
activist student groups to emerge. When state repres-
sion renders most civil society groups unable to effec-
tively challenge the regime, an opposition vacuum can 
emerge in which students become society’s only viable 
(and hence most influential) political opposition. In 
the case of Burma, while Burmese students failed to 
overthrow the military dictatorship and generate a 
democratic transition, the existence of an opposition 
vacuum reinforced students’ unchallengeable leader-
ship as the only political opposition against the mili-
tary dictatorship between 1962 and 1988.  
The concept of “opposition vacuum” might also 
help us better understand the aforementioned cases 
of Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand. Being the 
only sustained opposition force in New Order regime, 
Indonesian students were the first to protest against 
Soeharto.217 From 1970s protests regarding elections’ 
legitimacy (1971 Golput Movement), to the decisive 
1998 Reformasi Movement, students took the lead-
ing position due to an absence of opposition forces 
who were either suppressed or absorbed by the re-
gime. Similarly, in South Korea, where even moder-
ate political dissenters were highly suppressed at that 
time, students led the call for democracy. For instance, 
Progressive Party leader Jo Bong Am was executed in 
1959 for advocating peaceful reunification with North 
Korea.218 In Thailand, the 1971 coup and abrogation 
of the 1968 Constitution dissolved the parliament and 
disbanded political parties.219 Again, students be-
came the only potential opposition left with the capac-
ity to mobilize against the military. This framework 
therefore illustrates a potential direction for future 
studies on the emergence of student activism in non-
democratic societies where an opposition vacuum ex-
ists. 
Moreover, it intimates that students may possess 
a unique organizational advantage over other poten-
tial political actors in civil society under repressive 
regimes, likely because they have access to university 
campuses as organizational bases. These analyses also 
suggest that, even under circumstances where politi-
cal input and output structures seem highly constrain-
ing, students may nonetheless have crucial political 
opportunities that are absent for other groups, which 
highlights the importance of students in oppositional 
movements and necessitates the further examination 
of student activism in contemporary and future oppo-
sitional movements under authoritarian regimes. The 
concept of “opposition vacuum” is therefore useful in 
reassessing traditional assumptions underlying the 
dynamics of contention approach and theory of politi-
cal opportunity structure, which argues that “groups 
will not mobilize unless they believe that they have 
some access to the political system.”220
Student activism in Burma: past, present, and future
In Burma, from 1962 to 1988, underground 
structures were crucial in cultivating a student-activist 
identity through discussion groups and political mo-
bilizations. Such social appropriation of contentious 
claims fostered students to learn about the injustice 
that resulted from the military dictatorship. This fa-
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cilitated the process of actor constitution and cogni-
tive liberation that sustained the legacy of the Fighting 
Peacock, political awareness, and mobilization capac-
ity, despite the absence of civil society. After brutal re-
pression in August 1988, the military junta purpose-
fully eliminated the underground structures, creating 
a “lost generation,” which hindered the construction 
of a student-activist identity through underground 
political activities. It effectively prevented students 
from passing on the historical legacy of student activ-
ism to later students, and rendered the process of actor 
constitution and cognitive liberation unlikely. State-
led democratic transition from 2011 onwards and the 
growth of civil society ended the opposition vacuum 
and students’ monopoly on challenging the govern-
ment. Divergence among students also arose in the 
developing, pluralistic society, which allows multiple 
student groups to emerge that collectively represent a 
wider political spectrum and boarder viewpoints. A 
group of students are reconstructing students’ unions 
under the flag of the Fighting Peacock, yet there are 
differences in how the various groups want to func-
tion: some prefer negotiation, while others challenge 
the government. With the end of opposition vacuum 
and the beginning of gradual reforms, students are 
exposed to less political opportunities and thus less 
incentivized to urge for progressive political chang-
es. While democracy, political freedom, and human 
rights were the most important issues in the past, the 
main task of student groups has recently shifted away 
from politics toward education reform as a pragmat-
ic response to the change in POS.221 It also formed 
their support base as the majority of current students 
clearly prefer students’ unions to focus on student and 
university affairs and leave “high politics” to politi-
cians. This, in turn, facilitates an alternative form of 
actor constitution: the cultivation of “education activ-
ism” among students with a clear emphasis on non-
political claims such as education reforms.
Objectively, political parties and CSOs have taken 
over students’ leadership in the past. Despite the aging 
of opposition leaders, Myanmar still has plenty of for-
mer student leaders from 1988, 1996 and 1998 to lead 
the democratic transition even should all NLD leaders 
step down. While we cannot rule out the possibility 
of student movements in the process of democratiza-
tion, current students are unlikely to take the lead in 
the absence of favourable POS—i.e., the contraction 
of the opposition vacuum. Students’ historic role as 
the political vanguard of the country has faded away. 
The re-emergence of student groups reflects students’ 
struggle for a new identity, but at best, students will be 
just one of many potential participants in Myanmar’s 
democratization. As student leader Min Thu Kyaw 
said, “Students’ unions cannot take the leading role in 
Myanmar’s democratic transition.”222
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